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Abstract. This paper aims to show how the mathematical content of
Hilbert’s Axiom of Completeness consists in an attempt to solve the
more general problem of the relationship between intuition and for-
malization. Hilbert found the accordance between these two sides
of mathematical knowledge at a logical level, clarifying the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for a good formalization of geometry.
We will tackle the problem of what is, for Hilbert, the definition of
geometry. The solution of this problem will bring out how Hilbert’s
conception of mathematics is not as innovative as his conception of
the axiomatic method. The role that the demonstrative tools play in
Hilbert’s foundational reflections will also drive us to deal with the
problem of the purity of methods, explicitly addressed by Hilbert. In
this respect Hilbert’s position is very innovative and deeply linked to
his modern conception of the axiomatic method. In the end we will
show that the role playedby theAxiomofCompleteness for geometry
is the same as the Axiom of Induction for arithmetic and of Church-
Turing thesis for computability theory. We end this paper arguing
that set theory is the right context in which applying the axiomatic
method to mathematics and we postpone to a sequel of this work
the attempt to offer a solution similar to Hilbert’s for the complete-
ness of set theory.1
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1 The Axiom of Completeness
In 1899, after a series of lectures on geometry held at the University of Göttin-
gen2, Hilbert published a book not only fundamental for the subsequent devel-
opment of geometry, but also for the way of thinking about and doing mathe-
matics of the century that would shortly thereafter start: the “Foundations of
Geometry” (Grundlagen der Geometrie)3.
One of the most innovative aspects of this work is the way of thinking about
and using the axiomatic method, which is no longer treated as a hypothetical-
deductive method capable of proving theorems from true, self-evident, axioms.
On the contrary Hilbert transformed it into a versatilemethod, useful to investi-
gate the foundations of a science and building independence proofs among its
axioms.
The system of axioms that Hilbert sets up in the Grundlagen der Geometrie
is divided into five groups. In order: connection, order, parallels, congruence
and continuity. We have two axioms of continuity: Archimedes’s axiom and the
Axiom of Completeness.
We now want to analyze the latter and try to understand what led Hilbert to
formulate this axiom and why it occupies such an important role in the whole
construction of the foundation of geometry.
To the preceeding five groups of axioms, we may add the following
one, which, although not of a purely geometrical nature, merits par-
ticular attention from a theoretical point of view4.
Moreover Hilbert argues that the Axiom of Completeness “forms the corner-
stone of the entire system of axioms”5.
In thefirstGermaneditionof 1899 there is no traceof theAxiomofComplete-
ness. It appears from the second, in 1903, to the sixth, in 1923, in the following
form:
V.2 (Axiomder Vollständigkeit) Die Elemente (Punkte, Geraden, Ebe-
nen)derGeometriebildeneinSystemvonDingen,welchesbeiAufrechter-
haltung sämtlicher genanntenAxiomekeinerErweiterungmehr fähig
2See (Toepell 1986a) and (Hallet and Majer 2004), for a precise exposition of the origins of the
Grundlagen der Geometrie and of the development of Hilbert’s reflections on geometry in this early
period.
3When referring and quoting it we will use (Hilbert 1899) to indicate the first German edition
and (Hilbert 1900F) for the first French edition. Otherwise (Hilbert 1950) refers to the first English
edition, translated from the second German edition (Hilbert 1903G), while (Hilbert 1971) indicates
the secondEnglish edition, translated from the tenthGermanedition (Hilbert 1968). However, when
quoting from (Hilbert 1971), wewill point theGerman editionwhere the quote first appeared. More-
over, when quoting (Hilbert 1950), we will indicate if the quote can be found also in (Hilbert 1899).
4(Hilbert 1950, p. 15).
5(Hilbert 1971, p. 28); original emphasis. From the seventh German edition onward.
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ist, d.h.: zu dem System der Punkte, Geraden, Ebenen ist es nicht
möglich, ein anderes System von Dingen hinzuzufügen, so dass in
demdurchZusammensetzungentstehendenSystemsämlicheaufge-
führten Axiome I-IV, V 1 erfüllt sind6.
The axiom, however, appeared inprint for thefirst time in theFrench edition,
in 1900, in the following form.
Au système de points, droites et plans, il est impossible d’adjoindre
d’autres êtres de maniére que le système ainsi généralisé forme une
nouvelle géométrie oé les axiomes des cinq groupes I-V soient tous
vérifiés; en d’autres termes: les elèments de la Géométrie forment un
système d’êtres qui, si l’on conserve tous les axiomes, n’est suscepti-
ble d’aucune extension7.
There is also an axiom of completeness for the axiomatization of real num-
bers inÜber den Zahlbegriff, published in 1900.
IV.2 (AxiomofCompleteness) It is not possible to add to the systemof
numbers another system of things so that the axioms I, II, III, and IV
1 are also all satisfied in the combined system; in short, the numbers
form a system of things which is incapable of being extended while
continuing to satisfy all the axioms8.
Furthermore, from the seventh edition onward the Completeness Axiom is
replaced by a Linear Completeness Axiom, which in the context of the other ax-
ioms implies the Axiom of Completeness in the apparently more general form.
V.2 (Axiom of Line Completeness) It is not possible to extend the sys-
temofpointsona linewith its order andcongruence relations in such
a way that the relations holding among the original elements as well
as the fundamental properties of the line order and congruence fol-
lowing from Axioms I-III and from V.1 are preserved9.
The literal translation of the Axiom of Completeness is the following.
V.2 (AxiomofCompleteness)Theelements (points, straight lines, planes)
of geometry form a system of things that, compatibly with the other
6(Hilbert 1903G, p. 16).
7(Hilbert 1900F, p. 25).
8(Hilbert 1900a, p. 1094) in (Ewald 1996). In German: IV.2 (Axiom der Vollständigkeit) Es ist nicht
möglich dem Systeme der Zahlen ein anderes System von Dingen hinzuzufügen, so dass auch in dem
durchZusammensetzung entstehendenSystemebei ErhaltungderBeziehungenzwischendenZahelen
die Axiome I, II, III, IV.1 sämtlich erfüllt sind; oder kurz: die Zahlen bilden ein System von Dingen,
wleches bei Aufrechterhaltung sämtlicher Beziehungen und sämtlicher aufgeführten Axiome keiner
Erweiterung mehr fähig ist.
9In (Hilbert 1971, p. 26).
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axioms, can not be extended; i.e. it is not possible to add to the sys-
tem of points, straight lines, planes another system of things in such
a way that in the resulting system all the axioms I-IV, V.1 are satisfied.
In order to set about analyzing the content of this axiom, there are some
terms that need to be clarified: Axiome, Dingen, Geometrie. The clarification
of the concepts related to these terms will be used to explain Hilbert’s axiomatic
approach to the foundations of geometry and the central role that the Axiom of
Completeness plays in this respect. We do not want to trace the history of these
terms, but to investigate the role that these concept played in that historical con-
text.
1.1 Axiome
It is easy to imagine that the concept of axiom in Hilbert’s thought mirrors his
use of the axiomatic method.
Theprocedureof theaxiomaticmethod, as it is expressedhere, amounts
toadeepeningof the foundations of the individualdo-mainsof knowl-
edge10.
This deepening of the foundations amounts in an analysis of the basic prin-
ciples of a theory that are formalized by means of axioms. The goal of the ax-
iomaticmethod is toanswersquestionsaboutwhycertain theoremscanbeproved
with those principles and others can not11. But how it is possible to link ax-
iomatic analysis and mathematical practice? In other words, where does the
meaning of the axioms come from? In this first period of reflections on foun-
dational issues12, Hilbert seems to offer a point of view so far from a formalist
conception of mathematics that it may be almost seen at odds with a modern
approach.
These axioms may be arranged in five groups. Each of these groups
expresses, by itself, certain related fundamental facts of our intuition13.
This quote is partly the result of an immature reflection on the sources of
knowledge in geometry14, but it also springs from a notion of intuition that is
10(Hilbert 1918, p. 1109) in (Ewald 1996).
11In a letter to Frege, dated December 29th, 1899 (in (Frege 1980, pp. 38-39)) Hilbert wrote: I
wanted to make possible to understand and answer such questions as why the sum of the angles in a
triangle is equal to two right angles ad how this fact is connected with the parallel axiom.
12In the second period of Hilbert’s foundational studies, whose beginning can be placed in the
early twenties, with the beginning of the proof theory, we can see an evolution of the concept of ax-
iom. Yet even in this second period, the label “formalist” does not match with his concept of math-
ematical practice. See (Venturi) in this respect.
13(Hilbert 1950, p. 2). Also in (Hilbert 1899).
14For a detailed study of the origins and the early influences on Hilbert’s conception of geometry
see (Toepell 1986a), (Toepell 1986b) and (Toepell 2000).
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not the empirical intuition of space, as in the Euclidean formulation. Although
recognizing the intuition of space as the starting point of any geometrical reflec-
tion, Hilbert maintains that it is not the ultimate source of meaning and truth
of geometrical propositions. A different notion of intuition leads Hilbert to ar-
gue that the analysis of the foundations of geometry consists of “a rigorous ax-
iomatic investigation of their [of the geometrical signs] conceptual content”15.
As a matter of fact Hilbert is explicit in recognizing that the axioms of geometry
have different degrees of intuitiveness.
A general remark on the character of our axioms I-V might be perti-
nent here. The axioms I-III [incidence, order, congruence] state very
simple, one could even say, original facts; their validity in nature can
easily be demonstrated through experiment. Against this, however,
the validity of IV and V [parallels and continuity in the form of the
Archimedean Axiom] is not so immediately clear. The experimental
confirmation of these demands a greater number of experiments.16.
Accordingly, Hilbert’s notion of axiom, even if it is deeply linked with intu-
ition, does not have the evident character that it had classically. We cannot find
inHilbert the substantial coincident between intuition and evidence, that in Eu-
clid’s conceptionof geometrywasbasedon thenotionof spatial intuition. In this
modern formulation, axioms draw their meaning from a kind of intuition that
we can define contextual. It is an intuition encoding themodus operandi that is
obtained working in a field of research, in this case geometry.
We can find an antecedent of this kind of intuition in Klein’s words:
Mechanical experiences, suchaswehave in themanipulationof solid
bodies, contribute to forming our ordinary metric intuition, while
optical experiences with light-rays and shadows are responsible for
the developement of a ‘projective’ intuition17.
However a different conception of the axiomaticmethod and of a formalistic
treatment of mathematics18 will lead Klein to a different approach to geometry.
Indeed Klein’s geometrical enquires and the Erlangen’s Programme will always
presuppose an uncritical treatment of the intuitive data on the nature of space,
contrary to the basic principle that aims Hilbert’s axiomatic method. Indeed,
whileKleinwill try toanalyzeandclassify thedifferent kindof spaces,Hilbertwill
deal with intuitions prior to the concept of space. Wewill come back later to this
point, while explaining the different stages that Hilbert saw in the development
of a science.
15(Hilbert 1900, p. 1101) in (Ewald 1996).
16(Hilbert ∗1898-1899, p. 380) in (Hallet andMajer 2004).
17In (Klein 1897, p. 593).
18On this subject see (Torretti 1984).
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In the preface to theGrundlagen der Geometrie, Hilbert is explicit in pointing
out the requirements that a systemof axiomsmustmeet to be considered a good
presentation of a theory.
The following investigation is a new attempt to choose for geometry
a simple and complete [vollständiges] set of independent axioms and
to deduce from these the most important geometrical theorems in
such a manner as to bring out as clearly as possible the significance
[Bedeutung ] of the different groups of axioms and the scope of the
conclusions to be derived from the individual axioms. 19.
Here we see clearly that themeaning of the axioms is related to the technical
tools they provide, as they are used in proving geometric theorems. This mean-
ing is therefore intrinsic to the context of the theory.
Hilbert thus requires that a formal systembe simple, complete and indepen-
dent. We will consider later the meaning of completeness; however it is now
useful to note that a certain idea of completeness is related to the requirement
that the systemof axioms should be able to prove all important geometrical the-
orems. Moreover, as shown by mathematical practice, the more the ideas are
simple, the more they are deep and fundamental20. Finally, the demand for in-
dependence is for Hilbert a necessary condition for a good application of the
axiomatic method. Indeed, for Hilbert the independence of a system of axioms
is an index of the depth of the principles expressed by the axioms21.
We still have to explainwhat accounts for the truth of the axioms. The answer
to this question is clearly shown in a letter to Frege22 in the form of the well-
known equation that Hilbert saw between coherence, truth and existence.
Once shown that the criterion of existence is identified with that of consis-
tency, we still need to clarify what in Hilbert’s view exists and how.
19(Hilbert 1950, p. 1). Also in (Hilbert 1899).
20We will not discuss here the problem of simplicity, although it is partially linked to that of pu-
rity of the methods we will address later. In theMathematische Notizbücher (Hilbert ∗1891) Hilbert
writes: The 24th problem in my Paris lecture was to be: Criteria of simplicity, or proof of the greatest
simplicity of certain proofs. Develop a theory of themethod of proof inmathematics in general. Under
a given set of conditions there can be but one simplest proof. Quite generally, if there are two proofs for
a theorem, you must keep going until you have derived each from the other, or until it becomes quite
evident what variant conditions (and aids) have been used in the two proofs. Given two routes, it is
not right to take either of these two or to look for a third; it is necessary to investigate the area lying
between the two routes. As can be seen from this quote, the problem of simplicity is linked to what
would be the development ofHilbert’s proof theory; but this would lead us too far from the historical
period we are examining. On this subject see (Thiele 2003).
21Notice however that the system of axioms proposed by Hilbert was not entirely independent. A
truly independent system of axioms for geometry, but not categorical, will be proposed in 1904 by
Oscar Veblen in (Veblen 1904).
22Letter from Hilbert to Frege December 29th, 1899; in (Frege 1980).
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1.2 Dingen
For Hilbert, the existence ofmathematical entities is intimately linked to the ax-
ioms of a specific formal system. Hilbert considers the axioms as implicit defi-
nitions of mathematical objects.
The axioms so set up are at the same time the definitions of those
elementary ideas23.
The idea behind this position is a clear distinction between formal theory
and intuitive theory. The latter refers to any mathematical field of research that
features only one subject of enquiry and homogeneous methods.
Hilbert is explicit in saying that the axiomaticmethod leads to amore general
conceptual level.
According to this point of view, the method of the axiomatic con-
struction of a theory presents itself as the procedure of the mapping
[Abbildung ] of a domainof knowledgeonto a frameworkof concepts,
which is carried out in such a way that to the objects of the domain
of knowledge there now correspond the concepts, and to statements
about the objects there correspond the logical relations between the
concepts24.
It is important here to stress that for Hilbert the mathematical objects de-
fined by the axioms of the Grundlagen der Geometrie are not strictly speaking
geometrical objects but conceptual entities that can be interpreted as geomet-
rical objects. The intended interpretation is of course that of geometry, but this
does not narrow the range of possible interpretations that can be give to formu-
las that constitute the formal system.
We then can see three distinct levels of things: 1) empirical entities 2) for-
mal objects 3) elementary ideas. This distinction mirrors the evolutive steps of
a theory that we will see in the next paragraph.
This distinction explains the Kantian exergue that Hilbert places at the be-
ginning of the Grundlagen der Geometrie: All human knowledge begins with in-
tuitions, thence passes to concepts and ends with ideas25.
One of the main problem of a formal treatment of a theory is to explain why
the axiomatic system so constructed should be a good formalization of the in-
tended intuitive theory. This is the content of an objection raised by Frege.
Your system of definitions is like a system of equations with several
unknowns, where there remains a doubt whether the equations are
23(Hilbert 1900, p. 1104) in (Ewald 1996).
24(Hilbert ∗1921-1922, p. 3). Translation in (Hallet 2008).
25(Hilbert 1950). Also in (Hilbert 1899).
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soluble and, especially,whether theunknownquantities areuniquely
determined. If they were uniquely determined, it would be better to
give the solutions, i.e. to explain each of the expressions ‘point’, ‘line’,
‘between’ individually through something that was already known.
Given your definitions, I do not know how to decide the question
whether my pocket watch is a point. The very first axiom deals with
two points; thus if I wanted to know whether it held for my watch,
I should first have to know of some other object that is was a point.
But even if I knew this, e.g. of my penholder, I still could not decide
whether my watch and my penholder determined a line, because I
would not know what a line was26.
The objection is justified on the basis of Frege’s studies on the foundations of
geometry. Indeed, he acknowledged that the axioms were self-evident proposi-
tions and that geometrical objectswere abstractionsof empirical objects. Frege’s
critic, however, is easily rebutted by Hilbert27. In fact he argues that that was ex-
actly the strength of his method: to establish a formal system able to define an
abstract concept, which would respond only to the requirements imposed by
the axioms.
This is apparently where the cardinal point of the misunderstanding
lies. I do not want to assume anything as known in advance; I regard
my explanation in sec. 1 as the definition of the concepts point, line,
plane - if one ads again all the axioms of groups I to V as character-
istic marks. If one is looking for another definitions of a ‘point’, e.g.
through paraphrase in terms of extensionless, etc., then I must in-
deed oppose such attempts in the most decisive way; one is looking
for something one can never find because there is nothing there28.
TheproblemwithHilbert’s reply is that it just points out adistinctionof levels
but does not give an explanation to the problem implicit in Frege’s objection. We
will call it Frege’s problem and we formulate it as follows: why is the axiomatic
system presented by Hilbert in the Grundlagen der Geometrie to be considered
an axiomatization of geometry? In other words, if the axioms formalize the fun-
damental ideas of a theory and they are what allow themost important geomet-
rical facts to be proved, what are the criteria that allow to identify the class of
theorems we are interested in axiomatizing as theorems of geometry? And fi-
nally: in Hilbert’s view, what is the definition of geometry once the axiomatic
method has cut off the link between formalization and spatial intuition?
26Letter from Frege to Hilbert January 6th, 1900; in (Frege 1980, p. 45).
27Or at least this is what Hilbert would have answered, because he chose not to replay. Anyway
next quote is from the letter just before the one just quoted; and we can assume that if Hilbert did
not wrote Frege back is because he had already made his point.
28Letter from Hilbert to Frege December 29th, 1899; in (Frege 1980, p. 39).
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2 Completeness
In order to understand themeaning of the Axiom of Completeness we promised
to explain the meaning of the terms involved. However, the main thesis of this
paper is that it is not possible to understandwhat Hilbert’s conception of geom-
etry was without explaining the role that the Axiom of Completeness has in the
process of its axiomatization.
If we undertake the difficult task of clarifying the ideas of an author far from
us in time, and in the progress of the discipline he contributed to, somemethod-
ological precautions are necessary. First of all wemust avoid the use of contem-
porary conceptual results in anachronistic contexts. As a matter of fact, under-
standing the genesis of conceptsmeans going back to the timewhen those ideas
were not clear, not completely understood. For this reason an historical analysis
of this kind, even when it is precise and competent, risks obscuring not only the
intentions of those who went through that experience, but the scope and extent
of the ideas that are investigated. So, the analysis we would like to pursue here
aims to contextualize the choices made by Hilbert as regards foundations of ge-
ometry, without altering the originality of those ideas. We therefore propose to
go to the root of the problems that Hilbert addressed, trying to understand the
mathematical choices and also to unravel the philosophical ideas that moved
them.
We assume as our methodological stance that concepts do not proceed in a
straight line of reasoning, but they get more and more clear once they are used
in solving problems. In this way, ideas and conceptions at first vague are mod-
eled on solutions given to problems. These concepts then become indispens-
able tools for the discipline that uses them, so that they cannot be disregarded
if we want to understand a certain matter completely. In the exact sciences the
historical process is easily mystified in two forms: firstly, a retrospective look
tends to discover a linear progression of knowledge, and secondly the narrative
of a discipline often proceeds in the opposite direction to the one that led to its
formation.
In the case under discussion here it is interesting to see how this idea of com-
pleteness, which is still vague in Hilbert’s discussions, and for this reason so
fruitful, contained both the synthesis and the difficulty of concepts that a few
decades after played a crucial role in studies of logic and beyond.
2.1 Completeness of the axioms
Coming back to the concept of geometry, in the lectures on projective geometry
in 1891, Hilbert divides geometry in three parts:
The divisions of geometry.
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1. Intuitive geometry.
2. Axioms of geometry.
(investigates which axioms are used in the established facts in
intuitive geometry and confronts these systematically with ge-
ometries in which some of these axioms are dropped)
3. Analytical geometry.
(in which from the outset a number is ascribed to the points in
a line and thus reduces geometry to analysis)29.
There is here an important distinction: the one between geometry and ge-
ometries. It is also possible to find this distinction in the Grundlagen der Ge-
ometrie, but for orthographic reasons it can be found only in the French ver-
sion of 1900, where in the statement of the Axiom of Completeness we can find
thedistinctionbetweenGéométrie and géométrie Thepresence of newadditions
and comments indicates that Hilbert followed closely the editing of this trans-
lation30. From now on, with Geometry we mean the intuitive theory that is the
object of formalization in the Grundlagen der Geometrie.
Hilbert’s emphasis on analytic geometry stems from its importance in geo-
metrical investigations at that time, as, for example, in Klein’s representations
of geometries as groups of transformations over manifolds. However, Hilbert’s
goal is not analyze the nature of space, as Klein did, but to make an axiomatic
inquire of our geometrical intuitions. These intuitions are prior to the concept
of space and hence they cannot presuppose anything about it. Indeed few years
later Hilbert sharpens his reflections on the general concept of a mathematical
theory and he says that
Usually, in the storyof amathematical theorywecaneasily andclearly
distinguish three stages of development: naïve, formal and critical31.
Then, for geometry, Hilbert’s task is to analyze critically the continuity as-
sumption hidden in the intuition of space.
In (Hilbert 1903), Hilbert too contributed to the clarification of the nature
of the space, assuming continuity since the beginning. However, since a foun-
dation and not just a classification was sought in the Grundlagen der Geome-
trie, Hilbert sees his work as a contribution to the kritische stage of the develop-
ment of geometry. Thus, following the basic principle of the axiomatic method
of deepening the foundations, Hilbert tries to elucidates the more fundamental
principles of Geometry.
29(Hilbert ∗1891, p. 3).
30In the volume (Hallet andMajer 2004) there is a careful account of the editorial vicisitudes of the
French translation.
31In (Hilbert 1903a, p. 383) in (Hilbert 1970b). In German: In der Geschichte einermathematischen
Theorie lassen sich meist 3 Entwicklungsperioden leicht und deutlich unterscheiden: Die naive, die
formale und die kritische.My translation.
RivistaItalianadiFilosofiaAnaliticaJunior
9:2
(2018)
162
Giorgio Venturi Hilbert, Completeness and Geometry
Here is outlined one of the most difficult tasks of Hilbert’s axiomatization of
Geometry: to find a system of axioms able to formalize all the means, also ana-
lytical, used in geometrical proofs. Linked to these problems, there are consid-
erations on the purity ofmethod, but wewill face them later. Here it is sufficient
to say that Hilbert is not concerned with problems of uniformity of methods of
proofs32.
In the same lectures on projective geometry we can find the following sen-
tence, which still suffers from a conception that shortly thereafter would be rad-
ically changed.
Geometry is the theory about the properties of space33.
However, in Hilbert’s lectures for the summer semester, in 1984, entitledDie
Grundlagen der Geometrie there is no longer an explicit definition of geometry,
but rather of geometrical facts. It is also worth noting that in the 1899 Grundla-
gen der Geometrie we do not find a definition of space.
Among the phenomena, or facts of experience that we take into ac-
count observing nature, there is a particular group, namely the group
of those factswhichdetermine the external formof things. Geometry
concerns itself with these facts34.
Here there is a subtle, but basic, shift in addressing the problem of a foun-
dation for geometry. Hilbert is not trying to define what Geometry is by means
of the axioms, on the contrary he just tries to find a simple, independent and
consistent system of axioms that allows a formalization of all geometrical facts.
The completeness of the axioms to which Hilbert refers at the beginning of the
Grundlagen der Geometrie has therefore to be understood in the sense of maxi-
mizing the class of geometrical facts that can be proved thanks to the proposed
system of axioms.
In 1894, Hilbert was explicit in describing the goals he wanted to achieve by
means of his foundational studies.
Our colleague’sproblem is this: what are thenecessary and sufficient35
conditions, independent of each other, which one must posit for a
system of things, so that every property of these things corresponds
to a geometrical fact and vice versa, so that by means of such a sys-
32This is a concern typical of a classical conception of the axiomatic method that dates back to
Aristotele: “[. . . ] we cannot in demonstrating pass from one genus to another. We cannot, for in-
stance, prove geometrical truths by arithmetic” (Posterior Analytics: 75a29-75b12). For an historical
survey of this subject see (Detlefsen 2008).
33(Hilbert ∗1891, p. 5).
34(Hilbert ∗1894, p. 7).
35My emphasis.
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tem of things a complete description and ordering of all geometrical
facts is possible36.
Hilbert’s statement of intent is clear: find necessary and sufficient condi-
tions to describe every geometrical fact. Then the problem of defining geom-
etry disappears, since it is implicitly and extensionally defined by geometrical
facts. This is precisely the purpose of an analysis conducted with the axiomatic
method. As a matter of fact, in 1902, Hilbert says:
I understand under the axiomatical exploration of a mathematical
truth [or theorem] an investigation which does not aim at finding
new or more general theorems being connected with this truth, but
todetermine thepositionof this theoremwithin the systemof known
truths in such a way that it can be clearly said which conditions are
necessary and suffcient for giving a foundation of this truth37.
Thanks to this precise statement, we can make some general consideration
on the axiomatic method. First of all, this method is primarily designed to for-
malize an already developed field of knowledge. Therefore it is a method that
can be applied when a science has already reached a sufficient level of maturity,
such that it can be divided from other branches of knowledge. Then it is possi-
ble to develop an intuition internal to the theory capable of identifying the class
of facts that have to be axiomatized, together with the basic principles that al-
low their proofs. Moreover, it should be noted that Hilbert says explicitly that
the goal of the axiomaticmethod is a clear understanding of geometrical proofs,
thanks to the analysis of themeaning of the axioms38, and not the discovery of
new theorems.
Besides,Hilbert doesnot consider theaxiomaticmethodprimarily as a source
ofmathematical rigor, capableof givinganepistemological foundation formath-
ematical knowledge39, but rather as a tool which allows us to answer why some
proofs are possible and some others are not.
One of Hilbert’s greatest achievements in the field of the foundational stud-
ies has been to recognize not only the distinction of levels between theory and
metatheory, but also to understand that the metatheory was analyzable with
mathematical tools. However, Hilbert considered meta-mathematical investi-
gation as a deepening of knowledge about mathematics, and not as a genuine
source of new results; contrary to his subsequent work and what the develop-
ment of twentieth-century logic would show40.
36(Hilbert ∗1894, p. 8).
37(Hilbert 1902-1903, p. 50).
38Recall the quote from the introduction of the Grundlagen der Geometrie (p. 1), where Hilbert
declares that the aim of the book is “to bring out as clearly as possible the significance [Bedeutung]
of the different groups of axioms”.
39See (Ogawa 2004) in this respect.
40Following this line of reasoning it is perhaps reasonable to find an explanation for Hilbert’s mild
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In 1908, Hilbert still express opinions similar to those of 1902.
In the case of modern mathematical investigations, . . . I remember
the investiga tions into the foundations of geometry, of arithmetic,
andof set theory-they are concernednot somuchwith proving apar-
ticular fact or establishing the correctness of aparticular proposition,
but rather much more with carrying through the proof of a proposi-
tion with restriction to particular means or with demonstrating the
impossibility of such a proof41.
If the main point in axiomatizing Geometry is the axiomatization of all ge-
ometrical facts, what distinguishes them from other facts, whether empirical
or mathematical? Hilbert answers this question clearly, but he is not clear on
what motivates his choice; and it is on this terrain that Frege’s problem regains
strength.
2.2 Axiom der Vollständigkeit
Hilbert’s aim is to find necessary and sufficient conditions to prove all relevant
geometrical fact. So it is possible to define Geometry as the field of knowledge
whose true propositions are the theorems that can be proved by means of the
axioms presented in the Grundlagen der Geometrie.
As we saw in the last paragraphHilbert’s critical investigation of our geomet-
rical intuitions should also take care of the continuity principles that are deeply
linked with our intuition of space. This partially explains Hilbert’s attention to
analytical geometry. Judson Webb, in (Webb 1980), suggests that Hilbert’s goal
was to free Geometry from analytical considerations, in order to restore its dig-
nity and autonomy. However, more than historical or methodological observa-
tions, there is also another reason that ledHilbert to deal with analytic geometry
and in particular with analysis.
Hilbert talks explicitly of the “introduction of the number [Einführung der
Zahl]”, within Geometry, and its goal seems to be the arithmetization42 of Ge-
ometry in the axiomatic context. Moreover, following his concept of axioms, as
revealing theirmeaning in the demonstrative use, Hilbert’s aimwas to formalize
analytical tools by means of geometrical axioms.
Asamatterof fact, logic andanalysis alwaysplayan important role inHilbert’s
foundational work. In 1922, Hilbert expresses this view in these terms:
reaction to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. However, the quotes above are from the first period
of Hilbert’s interest on foundational issues i.e. before the twenties; while Gödel’s theorems where
proved in 1930.
41(Hilbert 1909, p. 72). Translation in (Ogawa 2004, p. 100).
42By arithmetic Hilbert means analysis and in this sense we use the expression “arithmetization
of geometry”.
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This circumstancecorresponds toaconviction Ihave longmaintained,
namely, that a simultaneous construction of arithmetic and formal
logic is necessary because of the close connection and inseparability
of arithmetical and logical truth43.
The foundational view proposed here by Hilbert is radically different from
the standard one that tries to ground all mathematical knowledge on a single
concept. This is what Frege and Russell tried to do with logic; or how a set the-
oretical, functional or categorical foundation of mathematics is interpreted in
modern times. Rather Hilbert was convinced that the tools offered by logic and
arithmetic were essential for a proper development of any branch ofmathemat-
ics. In other words, Hilbert does not seem to have any ontological or epistemo-
logical commitments in using numbers and logic; rather it is a methodological
concern44.
In all exact sciences we gain accurate results only if we introduce the
concept of number45.
However, according to Hilbert these tools must be investigated in a critical
manner.
But if science is not to fall into a bare formalism, in a later stage of
its development it has to come back and reflect on itself, and at least
verify the basis upon which it has come to introduce the concept of
number46.
In order to introduce the concept of number in Geometry, Hilbert defines a
calculus of segments and then he uses the axiomatic method to show which al-
gebraic properties of the calculus follow from the validity of geometrical propo-
sitions.
Here theaxiomaticmethod isusedwith theaimofunderstanding thedemon-
strative role of the axioms of Geometry. The idea is to generate a coordinate
system internal to Geometry, showing that some fundamental theorems implie
43(Hilbert 1922, pp. 1131-1132) in (Ewald 1996).
44This iswhy it is not easy to attribute anyphilosophical position toHilbert, although theproblems
he addresses have obvious philosophical implications.
45(Hilbert ∗1894). In German: In allen exakten Wissenschaften gewinnt man erst dann präzise Re-
sultate wenn die Zahl eingefuhrt ist. , in (Hallet andMajer 2004, p. 194).
46(Hilbert ∗1898). In German: Aber wenn die Wissenschaft nicht einem unfruchtbaren Formalis-
mus anheimfallen soll, so wird sie auf einem spateren Stadium der Entwickelung sich wieder auf sich
selbst besinnen mussen und mindestens die Grundlagen prufen, auf denen sie zur Einfuhrung der
Zahl gekommen ist, in (Hallet and Majer 2004, p. 194). However, even in this mixture of geometry
and analysis we need to be guided by intuition. In (Hilbert ∗1905, pp. 87-88), Hilbert says: [O]ne
should always be guided by intuition when laying things down axiomatically, and one always has
intuition before oneself as a goal [Zielpunkt]. Translation in (Hallet 2008).
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certain properties of numbers that are used as coordinates. In this way, the sys-
tem of real numbers is not imposed from outside, as in analytic geometry, but
arises from geometrical argumentation.
For example, the validity of Pappus’s theorem (called Pascal’s theorem by
Hilbert) is used to show that the multiplication that it is possible to define on
the coordinate system must necessarily be commutative. Thanks to axioms I-
V1Hilbert shows that the coordinate system thusdefined formsanArchimedean
field. However, since thisArchimedeanfieldcanbecountable, it is clear toHilbert
that the geometry that satisfies all axioms I-V1 cannot be immediately identified
with analytic geometry.
Indeed, the domain of the latter is uncountable, because it makes use of all
real numbers. So, Hilbert’s major concern is to define axiomatically a bijection
between the points of a straight line and the real numbers. The solution of this
problem is precisely the mathematical content of the Axiom of Completeness
If in a geometry only the validity of the Archimedean Axiom is as-
sumed, then it is possible to extend the set of points, lines, andplanes
by “irrational” elements so that in the resulting geometry on every
line a point corresponds, without exception, to every set of three real
numbers that satisfy the equation. By suitable interpretations it is
possible to infer at the same time that all Axioms I-V are valid in the
extended geometry. Thus extended geometry (by the adjunction if
irrational elements) is none other than the ordinary space Cartesian
geometry in which the completeness axiom V.2 also holds47
In this quotation it is possible to see how the Axiom of Completeness is used
to fill that gap between Hilbertian plane geometry and analytic geometry. The
way to achieve this is by adding irrational elements to the coordinate system
presented in the Grundlagen der Geometrie. As a matter of fact, the axiomatiza-
tion of the real numbers is simultaneous with the introduction of the Axiom of
Completeness for geometry48.
The irrational elements are also called ideal elements, by Hilbert. However,
he immediately makes it clear that the ideal character of these elements is only
relative the specific presentation of the system49.
That to every real number there corresponds a point of the straight
line does not follow from our axioms. We can achieve this, however,
by the introduction of ideal (irrational) points (Cantor’s Axiom). It
47(Hilbert 1950, pp. 35-36).
48Remember that the Axiom of Completeness first appears in (Hilbert 1900a) and then in the first
French edition of Grundlagen der Geometrie
49In (Hilbert ∗1919, p. 149), Hilbert says, The terminology of ideal elements thus properly speaking
only has its justification from the point of view of the system we start out from. In the new system we
do not at all distinguish between actual and ideal elements.
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can be shown that these ideal points satisfy all the axioms I-V [. . . ].
Their use is purely a matter of method: first with their help is it pos-
sible to develop analytic geometry to its fullest extent 50.
The reference to irrational elements echoes theproblemof thepurityofmeth-
ods, which is explicitly mentioned by Hilbert. However Hilbert’s solution is not
to restrict the demonstrative tools, allowing just those conforming to the essen-
tial properties of the object of the theory. Indeed, the same idea of an extra-
logical property of mathematical objects is contrary to the conception of ax-
iomatic method, as Hilbert made clear also in correspondence with Frege.
In fact, the geometric investigation carried out here seeks in general
to cast light on the question of which axioms, assumptions or auxil-
iary means are necessary in the proof of a given elementary geomet-
rical truth, and it is left up to discretionary judgement [Ermessen] in
each individual case which method of proof is to be preferred, de-
pending on the standpoint adopted51.
Since its aim is to show the possibility or the impossibility of a proof, the ax-
iomaticmethod is the highest expression of the search for the purity ofmethods.
In an interlineated addition to the 1898/1899 lessons Hilbert writes: “Thus, so-
lution of a problem impossible or impossible with certain means. With this is
connected the demand for the purity of methods52”. Hilbert considers the ap-
plicationof the axiomaticmethodas aprecondition for any considerationon the
purity of methods. Indeed, thanks to that it is possible to clear necessary con-
ditions for the proof of a mathematical theorem. So, the choice of the demon-
strativemethods becomes a subjective question, since it does not dependon the
nature of the problem.
This basic principle, according to which one ought to elucidate the
possibility of proofs, is very closely connected with the demand for
the ‘purity of method’ of proof methods stressed by many modern
mathematicians53. At root, this demand is nothing other than a sub-
jective interpretation of the basic principle followed here.54.
50(Hilbert ∗1899, pp. 166-167).
51(Hilbert 1950, pp. 82).
52See (Hilbert ∗1898-1899, p. 284) in (Hallet andMajer 2004).
53Remember thatHilbert’s proofswere not easily accepted by themathematical community of the
late nineteenth century. Therefore, instead of restricting the methods of proof, Hilbert put forward
an analysis of proofs that does not rest on external considerations on the nature of mathematical
entities, but that aim to show if a demonstrative tool is necessary in a particular proof. Moreover,
given the link between methods of proof and axioms, the justification of the means used in a proof
is brought back to the justification of the axioms and to the inference rules. In 1925, in (Hilbert
1925), Hilbert writes: If, apart from proving consistency, the question of the justification of a measure
is to have any meaning, it can consist only in ascertaining whether the measure is accompanied by
commensurate success.
54(Hilbert 1950, p. 82).
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Asamatter of factHilbert usedanalytic geometry to the full in the application
of the axiomaticmethod toGeometry; for example in the proof that it is possible
to develop a non-Deserguean geometry. This choice shows also that Hilbert’s
goalwas not a foundation of analytic geometry in the contemporary sense, short
of running into an obvious circularity in his reasoning.
In this context we can also explain how the axiomaticmethod can be used to
improve our mathematical knowledge. Remember that Hilbert says: “I under-
standunder the axiomatical explorationof amathematical truth [or theorem] an
investigation which does not aim at finding new or more general theorems”55.
This basic principle [to enquire themainpossibility of a proof] seems
tome to contain ageneral andnatural prescription. In fact, whenever
in our mathematical work we encounter a problem or conjecture a
theorem, our drive for knowledge [Erkenntnistrieb] is only then sat-
isfiedwhenwehave succeeded in giving the complete solution of the
problemand the rigorousproofof the theorem, orwhenwe recognise
clearly the grounds for the impossibility of success and thereby the
necessity of the failure56.
Therefore, we can clearly see in Hilbert’s thought a dichotomy between the
subjective side of the demonstrative tools and the objective side of the the logi-
cal relations between concepts. However, the objectivity of mathematics is not
needed to ground the mathematical discourse; indeed, this is done by means
of a consistency proof. The emphasis given to the objectivity of mathematics is
just a matter of justification of the methods of proof, hence of the axioms. We
need to stress here the difference between giving a foundation or a justification.
As a matter of fact, if we try to interpret Hilbert’s foundational efforts as a mod-
ern foundation for a mathematical theory, we see that we ran into an apparent
circularity of the argumentation, because analytic geometry is used in order to
show the necessity of the axioms that should give a foundation for analytic ge-
ometry. Then, this seems to support the autonomy of Hilbert’s foundation of
mathematics57. But, this point of view is incorrect, since a foundation is sought
where there is no foundation in the traditional sense. Hilbert does not try to
find an epistemological explanation for mathematical arguments, or an onto-
logical classification of mathematical entities, on a mathematical ground. On
thecontraryhe tries to justify thepossibility to givea formal treatmentof an intu-
itive theory. Even if Hilbert avoids any extra-logical commitments about objects
andmethods of proof, however the way he constructs the formal theory for Ge-
ometry is not autonomous from extra-mathematical considerations; we can say
philosophical. IndeedHilbert justifies the formalization of a theory appealing to
55(Hilbert 1902-1903, p. 50).
56(Hilbert 1950, p. 82).
57See for example (Franks 2009).
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intuition, logical reasoning and the concept of number. These concepts seem to
be forHilbert the starting points for anymathematical knowledge and construc-
tion. Appealing to thesenotionshe is able to say that the axiomspresented in the
Grundlagen der Geometrie formalize precisely analytic geometry, in its intuitive
character. This choice is indeed philosophical, because it implies a precise def-
inition of mathematics: the science of calculation, carried out by logical means.
This conception is quite astonishing if we think of the development of mathe-
matics in the last century. However it explains the role of arithmetic in Hilbert’s
conception ofmathematics, throughout all his work; where arithmetic is here to
beunderstood in thewidest sense, including also transfinite cardinal arithmetic.
Recalling that Hilbert’s goal was to find necessary and sufficient conditions
for proving the more relevant geometrical facts, we can affirm that the axioms
of groups I-IV, together with Axiom of Archimedes, are necessary conditions for
the development of analytic geometry, and the Axiom of Completeness plays
the role of a sufficient condition to adapt the formal presentation given in the
GrundlagenderGeometrie to the intuitive ideaof a geometrical theory thatmakes
use of the whole class of real numbers. Already in 1872 Cantor felt the need for
an axiom to make compatible these two sides of geometry.
In order to complete the connection [. . . ] with the geometry of the
straight line, onemust only addanaxiomwhich simply says that con-
versely every numerical quantity also has a determined point on the
straight line, whose coordinate is equal to that quantity [. . . ] I call this
proposition an axiom because by its nature it cannot be universally
proved. A certain objectivity is then subsequently gained thereby for
the quantities although they are quite independent of this58.
So we can distinguish two different kinds of axioms: the ones that are nec-
essary for the development of a theory and the sufficient ones used to match
intuition and formalization.
In the lectures that precede the first edition of the Grundlagen der Geome-
trieHilbert proposed that continuity be formalized, inways similar to Cantor’s59
and Dedekind’s60, which were able, together with the other axioms, to guaran-
tee the existence of a bijection between the point lying on a straight line and the
real numbers. However, Hilbert soon realized that there was need of less con-
tinuity for developing Geometry. Thus, following the general principle of the
axiomatic method of pointing out the necessary conditions, Hilbert chose the
Axiom of Archimedes. Indeed Hilbert’s aim was to explain how and why geo-
58In (Cantor 1872, p. 128).
59(Cantor continuity axiom): every descending (with respect to the relation of inclusion) sequence
of non empty real intervals has no-empty intersection.
60 (Dedekind continuity axiom): given any partition of the real line in two classes A ≤ B (i.e. ∀a ∈ A
and ∀b ∈ B , we have a ≤ b) there is a real number c such that a ≤ c ≤ b , for every a ∈ A and b ∈ B .
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metrical proofs were possible, considering knowledge as knowledge of causes.
In a letter to Frege, on December 29th 1899 (in (Frege 1980, pp. 38-39)), Hilbert
wrote: “It was of necessity that I had to set up my axiomatic system: I wanted to
make it possible to understand those geometrical proposition that I regard as the
most important results of geometrical inquiries” (my emphasis).
By the above treatment the requirement of continuity has been de-
composed into twoessentiallydifferentparts, namely intoArchimedes’
Axiom, whose role is to prepare the requirement of continuity, and
the Completeness Axiom which forms the cornerstone of the entire
system of axioms. The subsequent investigations rest essentially only
on Archimedes’ Axiom and the completeness axiom is in general not
assumed61.
Following this line of reasoning, the Axioms of Completeness can be seen
as the first, historically documented, instance of Skolem’s paradox; of course
Hilbert was not driven by considerations on the nature of logic, but the Axiomof
Completeness can be seen as a way of solving the problem of the existence of a
theory for analytic geometry that cannot prove that real numbers are uncount-
able. As amatter of factHilbert seems to argue in favor of an intuitive connection
with real numbers. Writing against the genetic method that tries to define real
numbers, starting with natural numbers, Hilbert says:
The totality of real numbers, i.e. the continuum [. . . ] is not the total-
ity of all possible series of decimal fractions, or of all possible laws ac-
cording to which elements of a fundamental sequencemay proceed.
It is rather a system of things whose mutual relations are governed
by the axioms set up and for which all propositions, and only those,
are true which can be derived from the axioms by a finite number of
logical processes62.
In other words, this matching of intuition and formalization, which tries to
harmonize the intuitions behind the system of real numbers and the real line, is
the intuitive content of the fifth group of axioms of the Grundlagen der Geome-
trie.
In conclusion,Hilbert’s analysis of thenotionof continuity ledhim to formal-
ize the Axiomof Completeness as a sufficient condition for analytic geometry, in
the form of amaximality principle.
There are some presuppositions that need to be made explicit in Hilbert’s
ideas. First of all, the scope of the axiomatization needs to be known right from
61(Hilbert 1971, p. 28). From the seventh German edition onward
62In (Hilbert 1900, p. 1105) in (Ewald 1996).
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the beginning. Moreover, Hilbert chose to include analytical tools in the formal-
ization of Geometry. This choice seems surprising if we consider that at that
time the development of Geometry led to the introduction of very remote con-
cepts, not only from classical geometry, but also from considering calculation
as the most important tool in Geometry63. The answer to this problem may be
Hilbert’s conviction that “In all exact sciences we gain accurate results only if we
introduce the concept of number64”.
All this showshow important logic andarithmetic are forHilbert. So, together
with the fact that formalization needs to take care of demonstrative methods
used in a certain field of knowledge, it explains howHilbert’s ideas developed to
the proof theory.
3 Idea of completeness and contemporary axiomat-
ics
Having explained what Hilbert means by completeness and what he was aim-
ing for in placing it at the center of his axiomatic presentation of Geometry, we
would like here to study how this idea developed after Hilbert.
We would like to say here that we do not want to explain how the notion of
completeness becamewhatwenow call semantic completeness, syntactic com-
pleteness and categoricity65. On the contrary, we would like to see if the idea of
a maximal axiom that tries to match intuition and formalization has been used
in other contexts.
In the analysis of the foundations of Geometry, Hilbert faced the problem of
finding a link between the subjective perception ofmathematical reality and the
objective character ofmathematical truth. However, this link was not fully justi-
fied, because he never even try to address the problemof explaining the concept
of Geometry. Hilbert’s solution is satisfactory as far as the Axiom of Complete-
ness, translated into a modern terminology -with second order logic-, implies
the categoricity of themodel. However, since it is possible to develop arithmetic
in the system of the Grundlagen der Geometrie, by the first Gödel’s incomplete-
ness theorem, this system is deductively incomplete, with respect to first order
logic. But for what concern the sense of completeness we used to explain the
Axiom of Completeness, we can say that Hilbert did managed to build a com-
plete system of axioms, i.e. capable to prove all relevant theorems of Euclidean
geometry and to formalize all methods of proof used in it. Anyway at that time
not only Gödel’s results were lacking, but also a good formalization of logic, able
63See (Hintikka 1997) for adetailed analysis of the importanceof combinatorial aspects inHilbert’s
thought.
64(Hilbert ∗1894).
65See (Awoday and Reck 2002) in this respect.
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to represet the logical tools used in formalizing Geometry.
There is a substantial link between the problem of matching intuition and
formalization and the problem of a mathematical treatment of logic. Indeed
whenever there is a need to formalize concepts that have intuitive roots, we
have to reflect on whether reasoning on these concepts is really possibile; and
at the border between subjectivity of judgements and objectivity of truths there
is logic.
In this respect the Axiom of Completeness is used to delimit the scope of ax-
iomatization and it witnesses an extra-logical relationwith the subjectmatter of
Geometry.
Hilbert’s work canbe seen as an instance of amore general procedure aiming
to establish some necessary conditions for the development of a theory and to
find a maximal principle as a sufficient condition for the formalization.
Another example, besides the case of geometry, is the formalization of the
concept of computability. In this case the need for a principle capable for com-
pleting the theory is really important, since what is formalized is a meta-mathe
matical concept. In this context, the analogue of the Axiom of Completeness
is Church-Turing thesis. It says that the class of functions defined by the λ-
caluculus (equivalently of general recursive functions and of functions computa
ble by a Turing machine66) is the class of all the functions that are intuitively
computable. Then, since all these functions are intuitively computable, Church-
Turing thesis is a sufficient condition that characterizes the class of computable
functions. There seems to be an important difference between the Axiom of
Completeness and Church-Turing thesis, since one is an axiom, but the other
a thesis. However the difference is only apparent, because as far as their use
in proofs in concerned both serve as a justification of the use of the other ax-
ioms. Indeed Hilbert says explicitly that the Axiom of Completeness is not used
in his geometrical investigations; exactly as the Church-Turing thesis is not used
in proving theorem of recursion theory, but just invoked to justify that all and
only those functions are intuitively computable. Again we can see that Church-
Turing thesis bridges the gapbetween the formalizationof a concept and the our
intuitive idea.
Another example of this kind is the formalization of the concept of natural
number by means of the Peano-Dedekind axioms67. In this case the presenta-
tion is completed by the axiom of induction as a second order principle: given a
66Indeed all these classes are provably the same.
67Besides the scheme for induction we have:
1. ∀x(x , 0→ ∃y (S(y ) = x)),
2. ¬∃x(S(x) = 0),
3. ∀x, y (x , y → S(x) , S(y )).
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non empty setM , an element 0 ∈ M and an injective function S : M → M
∀P ⊆ M  0 ∈ P ∧ ∀x(x ∈ P → S(x) ∈ P )→ P = M .
This axiom says that every subset of M satisfying the axioms and closed under
the successor function,must necessarily be the structure of natural numbers. In
other words is not possible to extend the system of natural numbers with new
objects and to get a new system of things that satisfies the Dedekind-Peano ax-
ioms, minus induction.
As in thecaseof theAxiomofCompletenessweareheredealingwithamethod
which, by using second order principles, fixes the structure intended to formal-
ize an intuitive concept uniquely. As for Geometry, bymeans of these axiomswe
give a definition of natural number. It is interesting to note that in both situa-
tions the result is achieved through the identification of a property which for-
malizes the demonstrative power of a concept: continuity in the first case, in-
duction in the second.
Therefore, it is interesting to askwhether this axiomaticnotion is still relevant
andhow theprogress of logic served to clarify this relationshipbetween intuition
and formalism.
4 The case of set theory
In the axiomatic context set theory plays a prominent role. This theory, in fact,
was given a satisfactory axiomatization capable of formalizing almost all math-
ematics, and maintained and improved the ability to analyze up to a minimum
thedemonstrative toolsused inmathematical practice, thanks to versatilemeth-
ods for building independence proofs.
In the last century the development ofmathematics and the invention of cat-
egory theory have undermine the widespread idea that set theory could be the
foundation of mathematics68. However if we confine to Hilbert’s idea of foun-
dation of a science as outlined in these pages -to apply the axiomatic method
in order to find necessary and sufficient conditions- we can say that set theory
provide fine tools to analyze the main possibility of proof of a theorem69 and a
unifying languagewhere it is possible toposeanymathematical problem. Hence
it is a good framework for applying Hilbert’s axiomatic method tomathematics.
Indeed, set theory dealsmainly with problems independent of ZFC, the clas-
sical first order formalization of the theory. However, the analysis of these prob-
68On this topic see MacLane’s andMathias’s articles in (Judah, Just andWoodin 1992).
69This is also the aim of what is now called Reverse Mathematics, although its main focus are sys-
tems that leis in betweenRCA0 and second order arithmetic. For this reason in ReverseMathematics
the axiomatic method is applied to theorems about countable structures. So, even if its analysis is
finer, its scope is much smaller then that of set theory. See (Marcone 2009), and (Simpson 2009) for
a presentation of aims andmethods of Reverse Mathematics.
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lems does not end with their independence proofs, but seeks to identify which
principles are needed for their proofs; as Hilbert did in the case of Geometry. As
a consequence these principles often cannot hide their combinatorial origin.
Secondly, as the analysis of the concept of axiom has shown, for Hilbert the
idea of completeness is related to the idea of exhaustiveness of the methods of
proof. However, the incompleteness phenomenon arising from Gödel’s theo-
remsmakes it always possible to extend these methods, although in such a way
that it is possible to compare them bymeans of their consistency strength70.
A further source of difficulty is the fact that set theory uses arguments that,
even if formalized in first order logic, are substantially of higher order. For ex-
ample, the axioms expressing the existence of large cardinals, while affirming
the existence of sets with certain first order properties, imply the existence of a
model for set theory, or of class-size objects. For this reason a reflection about
themethods used in set theory should also take into account ameta-theoretical
discussion of logic, not necessarily first order logic71.
Moreover, if we try to formulate an axiom that makes set theory complete
with respect to the intuitive idea of set, one collides with some conceptual diffi-
culties. These aredue to the fact that the very conceptof set is amental operation
of reducing to unity a plurality of things. Therefore the “set of” operation cannot
be limited to a fixed domain, without asking if this latter is itself a set. The his-
tory of the axiomatization of the concept of set is in fact a continuing attempt to
impose the least restrictive limitations, in order to avoid an inconsistent system;
as Russell’s paradox showed for Frege’s system.
However, even facing these inherent difficulties, the need for an axiom sim-
ilar to Hilbert’s Axiom of Completeness was historically felt quite early in the
development of set theory.
In 1921 Fraenkel expressed this idea as follows:
Zermelo’s axiom system do not ensure any character of “categorical”
uniqueness. For this reason there should be an “Axiom of Narrow-
ness” similar, but opposite, to Hilbert’s Axiom of Completeness, in
order to impose the domain to be the smallest possible, compatibly
with the other axioms. In this waywe can eliminate those classes, ex-
isting in Zermelo’s system, that are unnecessary for a mathematical
purpose72.
70We say that a theory T has consistency strength stronger than a theory S if in first order Peano
arithmetic (i.e. the induction axiom is a scheme) it is possible to prove con(T ) → con(S), where
con(T ) is the sentence expressing the consistency ofT . Surprisingly, and luckily, the theories that are
the object of study are linearly ordered, with respect to consistency strength. This order is induced
by the one existing among the axioms that postulate the existence of large cardinals. For an overview
of this subject see (Kanamori 1994).
71For an historical presentation of this problem, see (Moore 1980).
72(Fraenkel 1921). In German: Das Zermelosche Axiomensystem sichert dem Bereich keinen “kat-
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Once noticing that set theory is a good framework for applying the axiomatic
method, as Hilbert conceived it, to mathematics, it would be interesting to in-
quire about the possibility of defining a notion of completeness able to capture
some intrinsic aspect of set theory, within an axiomatic framework. In other
words, in which way it makes sense to try to reconcile the idea of a complete
theory with the phenomenon of incompleteness?
We defer the attempt to answer these questions to another work.
egoriscehn” Eindeutigkeitscharakter. Dazu ist ein weiteres, dem Hilbertschen Vollständigkeitsaxiom
umgekehrt analoges “Beschränktheitsaxiom” erforderlich das dem Bereich den kleinsten mit den Ax-
iomen verträglichen Umfang auferlegt. Hierdurch werden verschiedene, für mathematische Zwecke
unnötige Klassen von Mengen ansageschieden , die im Zermeloschen System Platz haben. My trans-
lation.
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